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Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development
And some Proposals for Research
R. Glen Berryman
University of Minnesota
A 1950 publication of the A I C P A , written primarily for readers of audit
reports, stated "Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the foundation of the public accounting profession." 1 More recently the same idea has
been restated as follows: "Independence has always been a concept fundamental
to the accounting profession, the cornerstone of its philosophical structure." 2
Auditors and the users of audit reports then and now would strongly support
the above assertion. Independence has been a developing concept, as evidenced
by shifts i n position as to what constitutes an independent status for the auditor.
F o r example, "strong" rules on independence have been adopted only recently.
T h e sections that follow review the historical development of auditor independence and note the need for the presence of its various aspects i n connection
with the attest function. Specific proposals for research are developed, w i t h
emphasis being placed on user perceptions of independence.
English Backgrounds
A n early concern for independence is noted i n the English
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, Section 102, which stated:

Companies

Where no other Qualification shall be prescribed by the special A c t ,
every Auditor shall have at least One Share i n the undertaking; and
he shall not hold any Office i n the Company, nor be i n any other
Manner interested i n its Concerns, except as a Shareholder.
T h e requirement of shareholding, however, has not been retained i n Britain as
an auditor qualification as evidenced by the Companies Act of 1862, which permitted but d i d not require shareholding, and by subsequent Companies Acts.
T h e provision against auditors serving as officers or employees of their auditees
appears to have been maintained continually i n the British system. The English
Companies Act of 1948 i n Section 161 provided that no person who is " . . . an
officer or servant of the company"; or is " . . . a partner of or i n the employment
of an officer or servant of the company"; is qualified for appointment as auditor
of such company.
T h e relationship of the auditors to the shareholders was established i n the
same 1845 English statute noted above. A t the first meeting of a company after
passage of that 1845 statute, the auditors would be elected by the shareholders.
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Further, Section 118 of that A c t directed that the shareholders be provided with
the report of the auditors. T h e Companies Act of 1900, Section 21, provided
that i f an auditor was not appointed at the annual general meeting of the company, the Board of Trade would, on written application of any member of the
company, appoint the auditor for the year and fix his remuneration. T h e Companies Act of 1929, Section 134, provided that the auditors were entitled to
attend any general meeting of the company at which any accounts that they
had examined or had reported on were to be presented and, further, that they
were entitled to make any statement or explanations which they wished to make.
Continued concern with auditor independence is evidenced by the Companies
Act of 1948. Section 160 of that A c t provided that a special annual meeting
notice would be required for either the appointment of an auditor other than a
retiring auditor or nonappointment of the retiring auditor.
Developments i n the U . S . to 1940
In the United States, independent status for the auditor appears to have
emerged slowly as a major concern. O f course, the profession itself d i d not
grow to major size and influence until much later than i n Great Britain. T h e
American Association of Public Accountants, established i n 1887, d i d not, i n its
early years, formally recognize the need for independence i n its constitution
or bylaws. A n amendment to the bylaws adopted i n 1907 d i d recognize the
desirability of avoiding incompatible or inconsistent occupations. Recognition
of the importance of independence is noted by the following comment of an
early practitioner:
T h e position of the public accountant i n respect to corporations and
their management is always an independent one. U n l i k e the attorney,
he is not expected to make out a case. T h e character of the service he
renders is impersonal. 3
T h e American Institute of Accountants, formed i n 1916, and its predecessor
organization d i d not appear to have been actively concerned with independence
until about 1930. A 1928 editorial i n The Journal of Accountancy demonstrated
interest i n identifying improper relationships between auditors and their clients.
T h e editor pointed out that an auditor should not be involved as a stockholder,
bondholder, officer, or director of the organization he was serving as auditor.
H e did recognize one exception, namely, a company could appoint an auditor
as a director when it was being reorganized. T h e editor stated:
T h e accountant should be so utterly divorced from financial or other
participation i n the success or failure of an undertaking under audit
that no one could ever point an accusing finger, however unjustly, and
allege the possibility of bias. 4
A t the 1931 annual meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, a proposal was introduced as follows:
R E S O L V E D , that the maintenance of a dual relationship, as director or
officer of a corporation, while acting as auditor of that corporation is
against the best interests of the public and the profession and tends to
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destroy that independence of action considered essential i n the relationship between client and auditor. 5
This resolution was referred to the Committee on Professional Ethics, but was
not acted upon by the Institute that year.
The following year the Congress of the United States exhibited substantial
interest i n financial representations supported by an independent review. T h e
Federal Securities Act of 1933, Section 77aa, required that certain financial i n formation filed with the Government be certified by an independent certified
accountant or public accountant. T h e Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section
78(1), stated that balance sheets and income statements were to be certified by
independent public accountants i f such is required by the rules and regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These are the first formal requirements mandating auditor independence.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, under authority granted it by
the 1933 A c t , adopted the following rule on July 6, 1933:
The Commission w i l l not recognize any such certified accountant or
public accountant as independent i f such accountant is not i n fact independent. Unless the Commission otherwise directs, such accountant
w i l l not be considered independent w i t h respect to any person i n w h o m
he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or w i t h w h o m he is connected as an officer, agent, employee, promoter, underwriter, trustee,
partner, director, or person performing similar function. 6
In 1934, the American Institute of Accountants' Council adopted and the annual
meeting approved the following resolution:
R E S O L V E D , that no member or associate shall certify the financial
statements of any enterprise financed i n whole or i n part by the public
distribution of securities i f he is himself the actual or beneficial owner
of a substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed
to acquire such an interest. 7
The S E C rule prohibited any interest, direct or indirect, i n any person w i t h
respect to w h o m the accountant is alleging independence, while the A I A position
focused on "substantial financial interest," and omitted any reference to employment.
In 1936, T h e Securities and Exchange Commission d i d amend its rule w i t h
respect to independence and adopted the Institute's position prohibiting any
substantial interest. 8 Shortly after this, the Securities and Exchange Commission
i n Accounting Series Release #2, dated M a y 6, 1937, discussed briefly the independence of an accountant as follows:
In response to such requests, the Commission has taken the position
that an accountant cannot be deemed to be independent if he is, or has
been during the period under review, an officer or director of the registrant or i f he holds an interest i n the registrant that is significant w i t h
respect to its total capital or his own personal fortune.
The Release continued:
In a recent case involving a firm of public accountants, one member
of which owned stock i n a corporation contemplating registration, the
3

Commission refused to hold that the firm could be considered independent for the purpose of certifying the financial statements of such
corporation and based its refusal upon the fact that the value of such
holdings was substantial and constituted more than 1 percent of the
partner's personal fortune.
In the decade of the 1930's, both the Federal government and the public
accounting profession adopted the view that auditors should be independent of
their clients. The S E C exerted leadership i n determining what constituted independence, as evidenced by its issuance of A S R #2. Emphasis was placed on
financial interest and on employment by the client of the auditor i n capacities
other than that of auditor.
Independence: 1940-1955
In 1940, the Institute adopted the following rule on independence as part
of its Code of Professional Ethics:
A member or associate shall not express his opinion on financial statements of any enterprise financed i n whole or i n part by public distribution of securities, if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a
substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed to
acquire such an interest; nor shall a member or an associate express his
opinion on financial statements which are used as a basis of credit,
if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a substantial interest
in the enterprise or if he is committed to acquire such interest, unless he
discloses his financial interest i n his report. 9
This adoption is noteworthy because (1) the financial independence rule first
became part of the Code of Professional Ethics and (2) when financials are
used for credit purposes, approval was apparently given for an auditor's holding
of a substantial financial interest i f he disclosed such holding.
In 1942, an amplification of the rule on financial independence was adopted—
" . . . i f he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest i n the enterprise
which is substantial either i n relation to its capital or to his o w n personal
fortune . . . " 1 0 T h i s action brought the Institute i n line w i t h the SEC's 1937
action i n ASR #2 as to investment, but not w i t h respect to other employment
arrangements.
The S E C i n Accounting Series Release #22, of March 14, 1941, reported an
opinion of its Chief Accountant, W i l l i a m W . Werntz, as follows:
W h e n an accountant and his client, directly or through an affiliate, have
entered into an agreement of indemnity which seeks to assure to the
accountant immunity from liability for his own negligent acts, whether
of omission or commission, it is my opinion that one of the major
stimuli to objective and unbiased consideration of the problems encountered i n a particular engagement is removed or greatly weakened. Such
condition must frequently induce a departure from the standards of
objectivity and impartiality which the concept of independence implies.
T h a t same release also cited, w i t h approval, the Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S E C
364, (1936) decision which held that the certification of a balance sheet prepared
by an employee of the auditor who was also serving as an unsalaried but principal
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financial accounting officer of the registrant and who was also a shareholder
of the registrant was not a certification by an independent accountant.
T h e S E C i n Accounting Series Release #37, dated November 7, 1942, indicated that i n determining independence, consideration would be given to the
propriety of the relationships and practices involved i n all services performed
for the company by such accountant. Accounting Series Release #47, dated
January 25, 1944, reported several situations i n which non-independence was
found, including the following:
1. Both an accountant and a business associate made loans to the registrant. Further, a son of the accountant was an officer of the registrant.
2. T h e accountant advanced funds to the registrant for financing a
new department.
3. The registrant was unable to pay the accountant's fee and the registrant pledged shares of its o w n stock to assure that such fee would
be paid. In addition, it had given the accountant an option to
purchase the pledged security at market price at the option date.
4. The accountant was the treasurer and a shareholder of a company
which sold some of a registrant's products.
5. The son of a partner was serving as assistant treasurer and chief
accountant of a registrant. The son resided with his father.
6. The accountant audited cash reports prepared by the client's staff,
entered them i n a summary record, posted such data to the general
ledger and made adjusting journal entries each month.
The above list provides additional evidence that the S E C wanted to maximize
the likelihood of an objective review by prohibiting a significant financial interest
or a close personal relationship w i t h the client.
T h e American Institute of Accountants through its Committee on A u d i t i n g
Procedure produced a special report i n 1947 entitled Tentative Statement of
Auditing
Standards; Their Generally Accepted Significance and Scope. T h e
second general standard stated, " I n all matters relating to the assignment, an
independence i n mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors."
Independence in fact is emphasized i n this document, as discussed on p. 17—
Independence i n the last analysis bespeaks an honest disinterest on the
part of the auditor i n the formulation and expression of his opinion,
which means unbiased judgment and objective consideration of facts as
determinants of that opinion. It implies not the attitude of a prosecutor,
but a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation on his part for
a fair presentation of facts which he owes not only to the management
and the owners of a business (generally, i n these days, the holder of
equity securities i n a corporation) but also to the creditors of a business, and to those who may otherwise have a right to rely ( i n part, at
least) upon the auditor's report, as i n the case of prospective owners
or creditors.
This position was subsequently affirmed i n the 1954 publication Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards.
In 1950 the S E C revised its rule on independence by deleting the word
"substantial" from the phrase "any substantial interest." T h u s , the S E C went
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back to its 1933 position i n which there was a prohibition against the accountant
having any direct financial interest i n his client. T h e Institute i n January, 1962,
some twelve years after the above stated S E C rule revision, moved to prohibit
the direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest i n an enterprise
under audit by the member. 1 1 D u r i n g the interim (1950-1962) a double standard
as to investment i n the client company prevailed—no direct financial interest for
S E C work and no substantial direct financial interest for other engagements.
T h e double standard also existed w i t h respect to employment—no employment
of the types listed i n A S R #2 was permitted for S E C work. T h e Institute was
silent on the matter of other employment of the auditor by the client company.
T h e concept of independence was being developed and articulated i n the
1940-1955 period. Specific rules were adopted to require independence. T h o u g h
independence i n fact was emphasized, the illustrations publicized by the S E C
could be interpreted to suggest that the appearance of independence was a major
factor i n its evaluations of the independence of accountants. Prohibition of an
auditor's holding of a financial interest i n a client was being established.
Independence: 1956-1973
T h e membership of the A I C P A i n January 1962 adopted the following rule
on independence as part of its Code of Professional Ethics. A R T I C L E 1: Relations with Clients and Public.
1.01 Neither a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a partner,
shall express an opinion o n financial statements of any enterprise unless
he and his firm are i n fact independent w i t h respect to such enterprise.
Independence is not susceptible of precise definition, but is an expression
of the professional integrity of the individual. A member or associate,
before expressing his opinion on financial statements, has the responsibility of assessing his relationships w i t h an enterprise to determine
whether, i n the circumstances, he might expect his opinion to be considered independent, objective and unbiased by one who had knowledge
of all the facts.
A member or associate w i l l be considered not independent, for example,
with respect to any enterprise if he, or one of his partners, (a) during
the period of his professional engagement or at the time of expressing
his opinion, had, or was committed to acquire, any direct financial i n terest or material indirect financial interest i n the enterprise, or (b)
during the period of his professional engagement, at the time of expressing his opinion or during the period covered by the financial statements, was connected w i t h the enterprise as a promoter, underwriter,
voting trustee, director, officer or key employee. I n cases where a
member or associate ceases to be the independent accountant for an
enterprise and is subquently called upon to re-express a previously
expressed opinion on financial statements, the phrase, "at the time of
expressing his opinion" refers only to the time at which the member
or associate first expressed his opinion on the financial statements i n
question. T h e word "director" is not intended to apply to a connection
in such a capacity with a charitable, religious, civic or other similar
type of nonprofit organization when the duties performed i n such a
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capacity are such as to make it clear that the member or associate can
express an independent opinion on the financial statements. The
example cited i n this paragraph, of circumstances under which a member or associate w i l l be considered not independent, is not intended to
be all inclusive.
This rule moved the A I C P A closer to the S E C position i n that it prohibited
direct financial interest i n the client and for the first time prohibited specific
employment relationships, such as director or officer of a client, d u r i n g the period
of the professional engagement. Independence i n fact was emphasized i n the
first paragraph of this rule, while independence i n appearance was specified i n
the second paragraph.
Effective March 1, 1973, the membership of the A I C P A adopted new rules
of conduct that included the following:
R U L E 1 0 1 — I N D E P E N D E N C E . A member or a firm of which he is a
partner or shareholder shall not express an opinion on financial statements of an enterprise unless he and his firm are independent with
respect to such enterprise. Independence w i l l be considered to be i m paired if, for example:
A . D u r i n g the period of his professional engagement, or at the time
of expressing his opinion, he or his firm:
1. H a d or was committed to acquire any direct or material indirect
financial interest i n the enterprise; or
2. H a d any joint closely held business investment w i t h the enterprise or any officer, director, or principal stockholder thereof which
was material i n relation to his or his firm's net worth; or
3. H a d any loan to or from the enterprise or any officer, director
or principal stockholder thereof. T h i s latter proscription does not
apply to the following loans from a financial institution when made
under normal lending procedures, terms and requirements:
(a) Loans obtained by a member of his firm w h i c h are not
material i n relation to the net worth of such borrower.
(b) H o m e mortgages.
(c) Other secured loans, except loans guaranteed by a member's
firm which are otherwise unsecured.
B. D u r i n g the period covered by the financial statements, during the
period of the professional engagement or at the time of expressing an
opinion, he or his firm
1. Was connected w i t h the enterprise as a promoter, underwiter
or voting trustee, a director or officer or i n any capacity equivalent
to that of a member of management or of an employee; or
2. W a s a trustee of any trust or executor or administrator of any
estate if such trust or estate had a direct or material indirect financial
interest i n the enterprise; or was a trustee for any pension or profit
sharing trust of the enterprise.
The above examples are not intended to be all-inclusive. 1 2
R U L E 1 0 2 — I N T E G R I T Y A N D O B J E C T I V I T Y . A member shall not
knowingly misrepresent facts, and when engaged i n the practice of
7

public accounting, including the rendering of tax and management
advisory services, shall not subordinate his judgment to others. In tax
practice, a member may resolve doubt i n favor of his client as long as
there is reasonable support for his position. 1 3
The need for the appearance of independence is not stated as it was i n the
previous Rule 1.01 (. . . he might expect his opinion to be considered independent, objective and unbiased by one w h o had knowledge of all the facts.) but
the listing of the prohibitions and the indication of specific situations which are
acceptable strongly urges continued interest i n the appearance of independence.
It is also interesting to note that some of the previous "Interpretations of Rules
of Conduct of the A I C P A Division of Professional E t h i c s " were incorporated i n
the new Restatement publication. Interpretation "101-3—Accounting Services"
emphasizes independence i n appearance by suggesting that the auditor consider
whether he is " . . . lacking i n independence i n the eyes of a reasonable observer." 1 4 It is also noteworthy that the 1973 Restatement includes Rule 202
which incorporates expressly generally accepted auditing standards. Those standards include the general standard requiring an "independence i n mental attitude,"
which is independence i n fact.
Statement on Auditing Standards #1, dated November, 1972, issued by the
Committee on A u d i t i n g Procedure of the A I C P A , included i n paragraph 220.03
the following statement. " T o be independent the auditor must be intellectually
honest; to be recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation
to or interest i n the client, its management, or its owners." Thus, continued
emphasis on independence i n fact as well as the appearance of independence is
maintained i n this document.
The S E C continued to push the development of rules related to independence,
as evidenced by its issuing of Accounting Series Release #81, December 11, 1958,
and Accounting Series Release #97, M a y 21, 1963. In A S R #81, 54 situations
were reviewed, 34 of which noted the accountants as "not independent," 19 of
which noted the accountants "have not been held to be not independent" and
one i n which accountants would be independent as to one entity and not independent as to another entity. T h e S E C i n A S R #97 found that a C P A i n
practice was not independent where he was one of three stockholders and an
officer and co-manager of a finance company w h i c h made loans to customers and
employees of a client who was a registered broker-dealer.
The SEC's primary pronouncement on independence is Rule 2-01 (b)
Regulation S-X. That rule, enforced today, states:
The Commission w i l l not recognize any certified public accountant or
public accountant as independent who is not i n fact independent. F o r
example, an accountant w i l l be considered not independent with respect
to any person or any of its parents, its subsidiaries, or any other affiliates, (1) i n which, during the period of his professional engagement
to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date
of his report, he or his firm or a member thereof had, or is committed
to acquire, any direct financial interest or any material indirect financial
interest; or (2) w i t h w h i c h , during the period of his professional engagement to examine the financial statements being reported on, at the
date of his report or during the period being covered by the financial
8

of

statements, he or his firm or a member thereof was connected as a
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee,
except that a firm w i l l not be deemed not independent i n regard to a
particular person i f a former officer or employee of such person is employed by the firm and such individual has completely disassociated
himself from the person and its affiliates and does not participate i n
auditing financial statements of the person or its affiliates covering any
period of his employment by the person. F o r the purposes of Rule 2-01,
the term "member" means all partners i n the firm and all professional
employees participating i n the audit or located i n an office of the firm
participating i n a significant portion of the audit. 1 5
It is interesting to note that the S E C rule does not include a distinction between
independence i n fact and the appearance of independence.
Accounting Series Release #123, March 23, 1972, endorsed the establishment
of standing audit committees composed of outside directors as a means of providing "protection to investors who rely upon such financial statements." Accounting Series Release #126, July 5, 1972, provided some guidelines for
accountants for determining existence or lack thereof of independence. It stated,
" T h e concept of independence, as it relates to the accountant, is fundamental to
this purpose because it implies an objective analysis of the situation by a disinterested third party." Examples were provided of situations i n w h i c h the
independence of accountants could be challenged. W i t h respect to management
service activities, the Release states . . .
T h e basic consideration is whether, to a third party, the client appears
to be totally dependent upon the accountant's skill and judgment i n its
financial operations or to be reliant only to the extent of the customary
type of consultation of advice.
As to E D P and bookkeeping services, the Release states . . .
Systems design is a proper function of the qualified public accountant.
Computer programming is an aspect of systems design and does not constitute a bookkeeping service . . . where source data is provided by
the client and the accountant's work is limited to processing and production of listings and reports, independence w i l l be adversely affected if the
listings and reports become part of the basic accounting records on
which, at least i n part, the accountant would base his opinion.
As to unpaid fees the Release indicated,
W h e n the fees for an audit or other professional service remain unpaid
over an extended period of time and become material i n relation to the
current audit fee, it may raise questions concerning the accountant's
independence because he appears to have a financial interest i n the
client . . . normally the fees for the prior year's audit should be paid
prior to the commencement of the current engagement.
As to business relationships w i t h clients, the Release suggested that joint business
ventures with clients, limited partnership agreements, investments i n supplier
or customer companies, rental of blocks of computer time to a client (except i n
emergency or temporary situations) would adversely affect independence.
9

Accounting
Series Release #144, of M a y 23, 1973, considered the independence of a large firm of public accountants and alleged that they were not
independent because partners or employees of accountant's branch office during
the time when they were w o r k i n g on the audit of a client, received payments
from the general partners of the client company totaling about $17,000, " i n the
guise of profits from participation i n the purchase and sale of "hot issues'."
D u r i n g the 1956-1973 period, emphasis centered on refining the rules for
determination of the existence of independence. T h e S E C tended to lead the
way i n establishing guidelines, though substantial efforts were made by the
A I C P A to clarify the meaning of its ethics and its concept of independence. T h e
appearance of independence was considered critical, though the profession and
the S E C remained as "judges" of independence. T h e A I C P A adopted the S E C
position on avoidance of any direct financial interest i n a client.
Aspects of Independence
The purpose of the auditor's representation as to his independence is to
develop i n users' minds a high level of confidence i n his reports. If that confidence with respect to his technical skills and his independence is not present,
then the value of the audit report is diminished greatly.
The concept of independence implies freedom from control and domination
by another party. It implies impartiality and the absence of bias i n the gathering
of evidence, interpretation of evidence and opinion formulation. T h e auditor
as an independent party must be w i l l i n g and be i n a strong position to insist
on that course of action which his professional judgment urges is the appropriate
one i n the circumstances.
Independence has a "time" component—it must exist for some m i n i m u m
period of time for each audit situation. A n independent state of m i n d must exist
from the time an audit contract comes into existence until the report is rendered and subsequent responses interpreting such report have been given. It
seems to be generally agreed that an independent attitude must be maintained
from the time that an engagement is undertaken until a l l audit work, including
reporting, is completed.
Independence has a "party" component—the auditor must not be under
the influence of the client or other party at interest. Aspects of this are reflected
by the question raised by a C P A , quoted i n a Forbes article, "Since auditors are
selected and paid by management, are they truly independent?" 1 6 T h i s raises
a series of issues, including: (1) W h o should select the auditor? (2) W h o should
make the decision to change auditors? (3) W h o should pay the audit fee? and
(4) W i t h respect to what parties should the auditor be independent?
Independence has a "what" component. Carey has stated:
Independence has three meanings to the certified public accountant.
First, i n the sense of not being subordinate, it means honesty, integrity,
objectivity and responsibility. Second, i n the narrower sense i n w h i c h
it is used i n connection with auditing and expression of opinions on
financial statements, independence means avoidance of any relationship
which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the C P A ' s objectivity as auditor. T h i r d , it means avoidance of relationships which
to a reasonable observer would suggest a conflict of interest. 1 7
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M a u t z and Sharaf suggest, "Three phases of independence are important to
independent auditing. First is the independence of approach and attitude . . .
The second phase . . . freedom from bias and prejudice, . . . T h e third phase
. . . to separate the two divisions (auditing and other services) of public accounting . . . " 1 8 Questions could be asked such as (1) H o w important is the
appearance of independence? (2) C a n independence i n fact be measured? and
(3) W h a t relationships should be avoided?
Independence has a "How shall it be maintained?" component. T h i s raises
questions such as (1) W h o shall judge whether it has or has not been maintained? (2) W h a t procedures should be adopted to provide assurance to users
that independence has been maintained? and (3) What operational tests shall
be applied by reviewers to detect a lack of independence?
Selection, Payment and Change of Auditors
The user group for audit service n o w includes at least management, creditors, the current shareholders, prospective shareholders, employees, and governmental units. External users i n general have a strong desire for the auditor to
take an impartial and unbiased approach to his work.
The auditor's role can be likened to that of a judge, who listens to the
charges or petitions, hears the arguments, evaluates the evidence presented and
its bearing on the issues, considers the legal rules that are applicable, reasons to
a conclusion and renders an opinion indicating his findings and their underlying
rationale. But audit practice differs somewhat. T h e auditor collects his o w n
evidence rather than rely on the two or more parties i n the case to each collect
evidence and present it i n an adversary proceeding. Also, no cross examination
is provided for i n auditing. O n the other hand, the public accountant must be
aware of the underlying rules, must reason to a conclusion and must render
an opinion as does the judge.
W h o should select the auditor? T h e parties i n a legal action do not make
the final determination as to what judge w i l l hear the case nor what jurors w i l l
be called. W o u l d the user's view of auditor independence be strengthened by
having auditors appointed by a governmental authority (e.g., an equivalent to
the English Board of Trade)? Some companies have audit committees composed of outside directors. Does this arrangement, as far as it is related to
selection of auditors and communications w i t h the auditors, increase perceived
independence?
W h o should pay the auditor? A judge receives his "fee" i n the form of
salary from the state, whereas the auditor receives his fee from his client and
the auditor has some control over the size of the fee. Is this arrangement on
audit fees one that should be continued or do the users perceive this arrangement
as one which impairs the auditor's independence?
O n what basis should public accounting firms accept new clients? A t the
present time, each firm adopts its o w n criteria for acceptance of new engagements. Consideration could be given to the question of whether independence
w i t h respect to any existing client would be affected adversely by the acceptance
of a new client.
W h e n should auditors be changed? W h a t internal or external changes i n
relationships might have an effect on independence? W h a t relationships between
11

auditor and client could impact independence? F o r example, would the hiring
by the client of several audit staff members have a negative impact? W h o should
be responsible for detecting such changes and then urging and or m a k i n g a change
i n auditor?
A number of questions have been asked above, and no answers appear to be
readily available. Research could well be undertaken to ascertain user and
auditor views on each of the above, including their implications for the behavior of the auditor under varying sets of circumstances.
What Constitutes Independence?
Independence i n appearance has received attention i n the literature. It
involves the perception of the auditor's independence by parties interested i n
audit reports. F r o m the standpoint of the external user, every judgment made
by the auditor has an independence aspect. Such judgments include but are not
limited to his search for clientele, staff hiring, assignment of staff to the engagement, approach to his audit investigation, evaluation of evidence, and development of his opinions. If any judgment appears to involve compromise, even
though of apparent minor import, subordination may be alleged and perceived
independence may be questioned. F o r example, the decision to omit a confirmation of a specified receivable or auditor acquiescence to the change i n the
wording of a footnote could give rise to a feeling by a user that the auditor's
judgment was subordinated.
H o w can auditors be assured that users have a high level of confidence i n
their independence? T h e perception of the user must certainly be taken into
account. H o w do we measure the reader's perception of independence? Perhaps
some measuring instrument 1 9 could be developed such that the profession as a
whole could monitor user pulse. Deterioration of the level of perceived independence could then be attacked by the profession i n a variety of ways, such as
proscriptions as to activities felt by the user to be impinging on independence
and education of the users as to the " r e a l " state of auditor independence. Different users and different groups of users may have different concepts of what
constitute independence and " h o w m u c h " independence is essential. T h e differences or even conflicts i n view points could present difficulties as well as
could attempts to develop recommendations for actions to raise the level of
perceived independence.
There has been little emphasis placed on the determination of what attributes create independence i n fact. Independence i n fact seems to require absolute
intellectual honesty and the absence of obligation to any potential user.
Professor Barrett has indicated that " . . . the audit profession's ethical
notion of apparent independence can be operationally defined as a sociological
role construct, and . . . its conception of real independence can be operationally
defined as a personality construct." 2 0 H e suggests that:
Professional Audit Independence contains two constructs. Interpersonal
Independence describes functional situations which promote or dysfunctional situations which impair the profession's auditor image as perceived by reasonable observers . . . Intrapersonal Independence is the
second order factor containing three operational content variables. It is
assumed that male individuals—who are field analytical rather than
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global field types, who evidence a low social approval need rather than
being approval motivated and who prefer to describe themselves i n
terms of independent rather than intermediate or dependent personality
typologies—tend to possess a high degree of intrapersonal independence
as characterized by their behavior i n test and non-test situations. 2 1
Professor Barrett goes on to indicate that, i n his opinion, on the basis of exploratory studies, interpersonal and intrapersonal independence can both be
determined by means of empirical testing. Additional research i n this area,
largely untouched to date, seems warranted.
W h a t relationships should be avoided? A t a recent bank's annual meeting,
a minority shareholder sharply criticized a $1,600,000 loan by the bank to the
company's auditors on the ground that such was a "conflict of interest and
jeopardized the independent status of the a u d i t o r . " 2 2 M a n y public accounting
firms are strongly interested i n "selling" management services. M i g h t not the
user of an audit report suspect a tradeoff between the accounting firm and its
client on the basis that the audit might be reduced i n scope or a disclosure
requirement changed i f the particular management service was "purchased"?
A s related earlier, the S E C has indicated i n various releases situations where
independence is questioned N o comprehensive research appears to have been
undertaken on this question. A substantial pay-off should be obtainable from
a comprehensive research project covering satisfactory and unsatisfactory relationships, particularly if user views are taken into account i n the project.
Maintenance of Independence
W h a t party or parties should assess the presence or absence of independence?
T o date, the public accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange C o m mission have been the formulators of the rules regarding independence and also
the enforcers of such rules. T h e view of the S E C can be presumed to reflect
their perception of the needs of the security investors for auditor independence.
However, it appears that a major thrust of the S E C work and of the A I C P A
documents is providing for the appearance of independence. If such appearance
of independence is the prime focus, why should not all external parties or their
representatives have a voice i n formation and enforcement of the rules on independence? W o u l d not such position provide a "watch-dog" and aid greatly
i n maintenance of confidence by users i n auditors' reports?
In developing confidence i n the minds of the users of financials, should we
institute a review of the audit report and its underlying documentation? In
the judicial system a judge's opinion is appealable to successively higher levels,
up to the Supreme Court of the U . S . W e do not have an equivalent procedure
for appeal of an auditor opinion, nor for a subsequent investigation of it by
another professional. M i g h t not the adoption of a procedure for auditing the
auditor enhance user confidence levels i n the effective independence of the
auditor? Research into the opinion of users and auditor reactions to such a
required review would be helpful i n anticipating the effect of such a requirement.
Operational tests of independence must await a determination of those
attributes which contribute to independence and those that detract from it. If
those attributes can be determined, the profession and the users of its services,
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or the parties designated to assess the existence of independence, can proceed to
formulate operational tests or guides to ascertain the existence of a satisfactory
state of independence.
Summary
Independence has, i n varying degrees, been a concern of auditors and the
users of audit reports since the early days of the profession i n England and the
United States. In the U.S., development of the concept of independence has
been pushed by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a representative of
one set of users. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has,
through various publications, articulated concepts of independence and has
adopted independence as a mandatory qualification for the auditor. It is suggested that the need for independence is related exclusively to the attest function
and that unless the user perceives independence to exist, the attest function has
extremely limited value. Various relationships between (1) auditor and client
and (2) auditor and external parties can have impacts on perceived independence
and independence i n fact.
Research needs to be undertaken with respect to user perceptions of independence; the relationships which they feel impair independence as well as
those which promote independence. Research could be undertaken on a joint
basis by representatives of the profession and representatives of various user
groups. T h i s arrangement should promote soundness of research design, i m partiality i n evidence gathering, summarization and interpretation, and acceptability of the research reports. T h e research projects could focus on many questions, such as (1) W h o should appoint and remove the auditors? (2) W h a t
relationships between client and auditor are likely to impede the exercise of
impartial, unbiased judgments? (3) W h o should pay for audit services rendered? (4) Should reviews of auditor work, including audit independence, be
undertaken? and (5) W h a t instruments best measure independence?
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